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By convention, chemical engineering requires us to develop a set of empirical equations that 
predict the transformation of one state into another. Process Safety generally lacks that discipline 
and as a consequence is sometimes suggested as having a lack of academic rigour. (Apologies 
here to the hard working risk, fires & explosions modellers) 
In the tradition of empirical chemical engineering, this paper takes a philosophical approach to 
“equations of state” as a way of demonstrating the transitions that have taken place in the 
approaches to Process Safety, consider the rise and fall of the importance of key components and 
present a “hypothesis” for discussion, that there is a “need to move away from the Engineering 
model and its linear solutions, to an Organizational Model where responsibility lies with the 
Individual rather than the System which is still the current trend.” [1] 
In reviewing this text, readers are provided with excerpts from an Events History of Process 
Failure which is intended to be indicative rather than prescriptive in its nature. It is taken from a 
wide arrange of sources only to demonstrate the frequency of major events across large parts of 
the world-wide process industry. 
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Introduction 
 
In the mid 70’s, two non-connected events occurred, the author completed his BSc in Chemical 
Engineering and in the UK, the “Health & Safety at Work” Act came into place. The latter, 
largely unchanged in concept today, gave us ALARP and made the author possibly legally 
responsible for actions likely to cause death or injury to employees, contractors and members of 
the public by his actions as a professional chemical engineer or so may line-manager said. My 
employer gave me a training course on the Act and its implications and reminded me that 
responsibility lies in my actions as a professional chemical engineer. On reflection, none of that 
presumption of responsibility was misplaced or changed, yet to date no individual in the process 
sector in the UK has been prosecuted, even though a substantial number of companies have met 
that fate.  
 
Events logged included: 
Date Event Name 
1974 Flixborough 
1976 Seveso 
1979 3 Mile Island 
  Table 1: Events having potential to change Process Safety Practice 1970-1999 
 
So my First Equation of State is based upon practice as a chemical engineer, who had never had 
a class in process safety, and is suggested as; 
 
Safety Practice (SP) =  
F (Materials of Construction (Mc), Property of Materials (Pm), Reaction Kinetics (Rk), Effect of 
Fires & Explosions (Efe)),  
 
written as;   SP= F [Mc, Pm, Rk, Efe]                                                  (1) 
 
and my source of reference: Perry. 
 
By the 80’s, things were getting a lot more serious, Safety Teaching in Under-graduate courses is 
now common place  
 
Events logged included: 
Date Event Name 
1984 Bhopal,  
 Mexico City 
1986 Chernobyl 
1998 Piper Alpha 
1989 Phillips Pasadena 
  Table 2: Events having potential to change Process Safety Practice 1980-1989 
 
 
and equation 1 had to be modified to include: HAZOP (Hz), LOPA (Lpa) 
 
and became Second Equation of State written as; SP= F [Mc, Pm, Rk, Efe, Hz, Lpa]                 (2) 
 
and my source of reference: Perry, Lees. 
 
From the 90’s, industry performance remains constant and Texas A & M and University of 
Sheffield move teaching to a Post- graduate level course and it was imbedded in University of 
Strathclyde full and part time Masters courses. The latter results in around 8% of degree credits 
having a process safety content.  
 
Events logged included: 
Date Event Name 
1990 Arco, Texas 
1994 WNC-Nitro Chemicals, Germany 
1995 Albright & Wilson, Oldbury, UK 
1998 Longford, Australia 
  Table 3: Events having potential to change Process Safety Practice 1990-1999 
 
Equation 2 had to be modified to include: Safety Case/COMAH (Sc), QRA(Qra), 
 
and became Third Equation of State written as; SP= F [Mc, Pm, Rk, Efe, Hz, Lpa, Sc, Qra,]       (3) 
 
and my source of reference: Perry, Lees, CCPS (Eng. Design for Process Safety) Kletz (What 
went wrong) 
 
When we reach the 2000 decade, Management of Safety becomes a real driving force and 
equation 3 had to be modified to include: Management of Change (Mch), Swiss Cheese Model 
(Scm) and Safety Management Systems (SMS) 
 
and became Fourth Equation of State written as;  
SP= F [Mc, Pm, Rk, Efe, Hz, Lpa, Sc, Qra, Mch, Scm, SMS]                              (4) 
 
Events logged included: 
Date Event Name 
2001 Conoco Humber 
AZF Toulouse 
2004 Skikda LNG Algeria 
2005 Texas City 
Mumbia High North Field 
Buncefield 
Songhua River, China 
2009 Caribbean Pet Corp Tank Farm 
  Table 4: Events having potential to change Process Safety Practice 2000-2099 
 
and my source of reference: Perry, Lees, CCPS (Eng. Design for Process Safety) Kletz (What 




Finally, arriving at the 2010’s decade which is still underway, we are presented by a worrying 
trend of failures in large companies who have bon-fide safety systems in place yet are suffering 
from a breakdown in procedure. Safety case has changed by virtue of COMAH becoming 
COMAH2 (Ch
2) 
Events logged included: 
Date Event Name 
2010 Deep Water Horizon/Mocondo 
Dupont Belle 
Tesoro Refinery 
2012 US Ink 
Chevron Richmond, CA 
2013 Williams Olefins 
2014 Du Ponte Porte 
2015 ExxonMobil Torrance, CA 
2015 Tianjin, China 
  Table 5: Events having potential to change Process Safety Practice 2010-2016 
 
and equation 4 had to be modified to include: Leading/Lagging Indicators (Lli), Stress Cracking 
(Scr), Management of Safety Competence (Msc) 
and became Fifth Equation of State written as;    
 
SP= F [Mc, Pm, Rk, Efe, Hz, Lpa, Sc, Qra, Mch, Scm, Ch
2, Lli, Scr, Msc  ]                                         (5) 
 
and my source of reference: Perry, Lees, CCPS (Eng. Design for Process Safety) Kletz (What 
went wrong), IChemE (Hazop), Reason (Human Factors), CCPS (Implementing Process Safety 
Management System), CCPS (Integrating Management Systems & Metrics to improve Process 
Safety Performance) and 30 other books on my shelf but lastly Dekker [2] (Drift into Failure)  
 
and was perhaps now impossible to solve. Or was there a link in Msc and Drift into Failure 
Discussion 
At this point, we need to ask why nothing appears to have change, events still occur although 
some writers suggest that performance is improving because we are killing less people as more 
have become employed.  
To understand why there is still a problem, it’s worth considering some of the writing son the 
causes of this Atrophy of Progress and the lessons that need to be drawn. 
Charles Perrow [3], an organizational theorist, suggests a bleak proposition that “accidents are 
inevitable in complex, tightly-coupled systems ……...regardless of the skills of their operators 
and managers.” 
Hence the title: accidents in such systems are 'normal'" According to Perrow the redundancies 
that go to make up defences-in-depth have three dangerous features. 
1. Redundant defensive back-ups increase the interactive complexity of high-technology 
organizations and thus increase the likelihood of unforeseeable common-mode failures. 
While the assumption of independence may be appropriate for purely technical 
breakdowns, human errors at the 'sharp end', in the maintenance sector and in the 
managerial domains are uniquely capable of creating failures that can affect a number of 
defensive layers simultaneously" 
2.  Adding redundancy makes the system more opaque to the people who nominally control 
and manage it. Undiscovered errors and other latent problems accumulate over time and 
increase the likelihood of the 'holes' in the defensive lining up to permit the passage of an 
accident trajectory. This alignment of the gaps can be created either by interactive 
common-mode failures or by the simultaneous disabling of supposedly independent 
defences, as at Chernobyl. 
3. As a consequence of this dangerous concealment, and because their obvious engineering 
sophistication, redundant defences can cause systems operators and managers to forget to 
be afraid. This false sense of security prompts them to strive even higher levels of 
production. Fixes including safety devices, often merely allow those in charge to run the 
system faster, or… with bigger explosives” 
 
Karl Weick reinforces this view of unstable systems in control and tells us that “We know that 
single causes are rare, but we don't know how small events can become chained together so that 
they result in a disastrous outcome. In the absence of this understanding, people must wait until 
some crisis actually occurs before they can diagnose a problem, rather than be in a position to 
detect a potential problem before it emerges. 
To anticipate and forestall disasters is to understand regularities in the ways small events can 
combine to have disproportionately large effects.” [4]  
In taking forward this view, we appear to set ourselves a challenge of inevitable failure and if 
one were to take a pessimistic view of the safety history of the process industries then this may 
well be the case. Although this is where Reason[5] brings us and this papers challenge in 
“Making Sense of Reason”. His “Safety Space” is a natural extension of the resistance-
vulnerability continuum introduced in the previous section. It is a boundary within which the 
current resistance or vulnerability of an individual or an organization is represented. As shown in 
Figure 1, it is cigar-shaped, with extreme resistance located at the left-hand end and extreme 
vulnerability at the right-hand end. The shape acknowledges that most people or organizations 
will occupy some intermediate point within this space. 
An organization's position within the safety space is determined by the quality of the processes 
used to combat its operational hazards. In other words, its location on the resistance-vulnerability 
dimension will be a function of the extent and integrity of its defences at anyone point in time. 
However, here is no such thing as absolute safety, human fallibility, latent conditions and the 
possibility of chance conjunctions of these accident-producing factors continue to exist, even the 
most intrinsically resistant organizations-those at the extreme left-hand end- can still have 
accidents. By the same token, 'lucky' but unsafe organizations at the extreme right-hand end of 







Fig 1: The Safety Space (Reason Managing the Risk of Organizational Incidents) 
“The key to navigating the safety space lies in appreciating what is manageable and what is not. 
Many organizations treat safety management as a negative production process, they set reduced 
negative outcome targets for the coming accounting period (e.g., 'Next year we'll reduce our lost-
time accidents by half'), yet accidents by their nature, are not directly controllable, so much of 
their causal variance lies outside the organization's sphere of influence. The organisation can 
only defend against hazards; it cannot remove or avoid them and still stay in business. Similarly, 
an organization can only strive to minimize unsafe acts, it cannot eliminate them altogether, and 
figure 2 demonstrates some of the high level factors that need to be in place.” 
  
Fig 2: A summary of the principal factors involved in navigating the “Safety Space” with The Driving Forces and 




Effective safety management is more like a long-term fitness programme than negative 
production. Rather than struggling vainly to exercise direct control over incidents and accidents, 
managers should regularly measure and improve those processes--design, hardware, training, 
Increasing Resistance Increasing Vulnerability 
procedures, maintenance, planning, budgeting, communication, goal conflicts, and the like-that 
are known to be implicated in the occurrence of organizational accidents. These are the 
manageable processes determining a system's safety health. They are, in any case, the processes 
that managers are hired to manage; safety management is not an add-on, but an essential part of 
the system's core business.  
Perhaps safety indictors need brought into the management world, where there is no room for 
“loss time statistics”, “leading/lagging indicators”, or current position on the “Heinrich’s Safety 
Triangle/Dashboard” and more about: 
 Did the work force feel safe at work today? 
 What did we do safely today to make the business more secure? 
 What marginal gains have we developed today to make us all safer? 
 
These are perhaps 3 from many indicators to be used by managers who normally show concern 
about the viability of their business by asking about Quality (throughput) & Financial (Cash at 
bank) indicators. 
However, there is a challenge in this view and in addressing “why”, it’s is suggested here that the 
concept of competence or the lack of it is the problem. 
In his review of “Texas City Refinery Explosion: Lessons Learned”, Mogford [6] mentions five 
underlying causes, all management responsibilities and two in particular are linked to the theme 
of this paper: 
“Secondly, process safety, operations performance and systematic risk reduction 
priorities had not been set nor consistently reinforced by management. Safety lessons 
from other parts of BP were not acted on. 
And finally, poor performance management and vertical communication in the refinery 
meant there was no adequate early warning system of problems and no independent 
means of understanding the deteriorating standards in the plant through thorough audit of 
the organisation.” 
This is reinforced in the Baker [7] commission report for BP,  
“Recommendation #3 
– process safety knowledge and expertise 
BP should develop and implement a system to ensure that its executive management, its 
refining line management above the refinery level, and all U.S. refining personnel, 
including managers, supervisors, workers, and contractors, possess an appropriate level 
of process safety knowledge and expertise.” 
 
BP and many other companies have done much in progressing this idea, yet CCPS’s Guidelines 
for Auditing Process Safety Management Systems (2nd edition 2011) places “Training and 
Performance Assurance” at p547 out of 835, and this really returns to the start of this paper, if 
the senior management don’t understand 
The Process Safety First Equation of State; 
 
Safety Practice (SP) =  
F (Materials of Construction (Mc), Property of Materials (Pm), Reaction Kinetics (Rk), Effect of 
Fires & Explosions (Efe)),  
 
Just understanding Cash Flow, Six Sigma, Coaching & Leadership and all the other chapters of 
“How to be an Even Better Manager: A Complete A-Z of Proven Techniques and Essential 
Skills” or some other book of that ilk, is not being a manager and the anthology of Process safety 
events presented in this paper will continue.  
 
As a closing statement, I met recently with a senior executive who had just return from a court 
case where his company pled guilty to causing the death of one of its workforce. He hadn’t been 
around during the time of the event, yet was deeply affected by the pain still being suffered by 
the victims’ relatives. Needless to say, his actions in involving his directors and line managers in 
managing safety are changing radically. 
 
Further Reading 
In closing this paper and in support of the argument presented, I would urge readers to consider 
G. He, L. Zang, Y. Lu & A. Mol: “Managing major Chemical accidents in China: Towards 
effective risk information” Journal of Hazardous Materials March 2011 for the statistics 
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